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SERUM HEPATITIS THROUGH BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS:
A WRONG WITHOUT A REMEDY?
by Donald L. Sweatt
The use of blood transfusions as a therapeutic device is one of the most
significant accomplishments of medical science in the last half-century.
Countless lives have undoubtedly been saved through the use of this tech-
nique. But, as with most major medical advances, the transfusing of blood
is not without its attendant dangers, because it may result in death or
injury to the recipient of the blood. A primary cause of such death or
injury is diseases transmitted through a blood or plasma transfusion.!
At present, there are three major diseases that can be transmitted through
transfusions: malaria, syphilis, and homologous serum hepatitis.' Malaria
and syphilis are no longer considered significant problems. But homologous
serum hepatitis' is presently regarded as the most serious problem in the
use of blood transfusion therapy' because of the frequency with which it
occurs and the severity of its effects.'
Serum hepatitis is a form of hepatitis (an inflamation of the liver caused
by a virus) which is normally transmitted by an injection of human blood
or some product derived therefrom.' Even though it may be contracted as
a result of a single transfusion, the risk of infection rises sharply when
' Recipient death or injury may be caused by a reaction resulting from the transfusing of in-
compatible blood. Thomas, Blood Transfusion Liability, 10 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 469 (1961).
"Allergic" reactions are of a minor form which usually result in nothing more than patient dis-
comfort for a short time due to skin rashes, chills, and fever. Since the consequences of such re-
actions are so minor, lack of a method of preventing them does not present any serious problems.
Haut & Alter, Blood Transfusions-Strict Liability?, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 557, 558 (1969). The
other type of reaction caused by incompatible blood is most serious. Known as the hemolytic trans-
fusion reaction, it often results in death or serious morbidity. VanWormer, Blood Transfusion Ther-
apy; Pitfalls and Practice, 1968 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 55, 65. Hemolytic reactions occur through
errors made in determining the ABO and RH types of the blood. Haut & Alter, supra, at 558.
Since tests are available which easily determine the ABO and RH types of blood, and are routinely
made by all hospitals, hemolytic reactions are normally caused by transfusion of the wrong unit
of blood as a result of careless clerical or technical errors. Hemolytic reactions can also result from
an incompatibility of other factors, such as the Duffy factor, the Kell factor, and the M-N fac-
tors. However, these factors are seldom responsible for a reaction and, as a practical measure, the
donor's blood is seldom tested for them. With the tests currently available, requiring all donor
blood to be tested for such factors would be too great a burden on hospitals and blood banks.
Thomas, supra, at 471-72.
Thomas, supra note 1, at 473.
3 Id.
' Malaria and syphilis rarely occur through transfusion since they are easily detected in the
blood. See VanWormer, supra note 1, at 65.
"Serum hepatitis is a syndrome or group of signs and symptoms produced artificially by in-
noculation with a filterable agent known as virus B." 14 AM. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS Hepatitis §
5, at 121 (1964). Homologous serum hepatitis, or serum hepatitis, is also known as serum jaundice,
homologous serum jaundice, post-vaccinal hepatitis, innoculation jaundice, transfusion jaundice, and
late arsphenamine jaundice. Id. S 4, at 119.
6 VanMeveren, The Extension of Liability to Service Contracts-Empbasizing the Furnishing of
Unfit Blood for Transfusion, 6 AM. Bus. L.J. 517, 518 (1968).
I 'Serum hepatitis is estimated to occur as a complication in 0.25% to 3% of all whole blood
transfusions and in as many as 12% of all pooled plasma transfusions. Id. at 518.
6 Habegger, Blood Banking, 1969 MED. TRIAL TscH. Q. 103, 111-12. Serum hepatitis may also
be transmitted by contaminated blood on any instrument, such as a needle or scalpel, that pierces
the skin or mucous membrane. However, transmission by such methods is extremely rare because
of the sterilization procedures commonly observed in the practice of medicine. 14 AM. JuR. PROOF
OF FACTS Hepatitis § 8, at 126 (1964).
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multiple blood or plasma transfusions are given.' The risk also rises sharply,
both as to the possibility of infection and severity of effects, in patients
over forty years of age."
However, the increased risk of transmitting serum hepatitis because of
multiple transfusions or recipient age is not the serious problem. The major
difficulty lies in the fact that there is allegedly no possible method of de-
tecting the serum hepatitis antigen in the blood of the donor. Since any
donor, even though presently healthy, who has ever had hepatitis may have
the antigen in his blood, the problem of detectibility is an extremely
crucial one. 1 This problem has become increasingly important in recent
years, especially to the legal profession, because of cases in which the courts,
accepting the argument that the antigen cannot be detected in a donor's
blood, have denied recovery for injuries caused by serum hepatitis."
I. THE ELUSIVE ANTIGEN: Is DETECTION POSSIBLE?
Detectibility becomes a crucial issue whenever the question arises con-
cerning whether a hospital or blood bank can be held liable for transfusing
blood contaminated with serum hepatitis. If it could ever be established
that a practical test exists for detecting the serum hepatitis (SH) antigen
in the blood of the donor, either the hospital or blood bank involved could
be held liable for negligent failure to conduct the proper tests." The
problem lies in the fact that no such test has yet been established, or
accepted by any court. However, there has recently been a conflict of
authority as to whether such a test actually exists.'4 Since in the past courts
have placed much emphasis on detectibility, a constant re-evaluation of
applicable medical research is mandatory."
The tests most often suggested to detect the presence of hepatitis virus in
the blood of prospective donors have been the thymol turbidity test, the
urine bilirubin test, and the elevated serum glutamic oxalactic transaminase
activity. Despite their impressive names, these are nothing more than
simple liver function tests, and they are not specifically designed for the
"H. CONN, CURRENT THERAPY 320 (1968).
ld.
11Habegger, supra note 8, at 112.
52 In many of the cases where it was held that physicians, hospitals, or blood banks were not
liable for transfusing blood contaminated with serum hepatitis virus, the courts seemed strongly
influenced by the supposed lack of an adequate means of detection. See Merck & Co. v. Kidd,
242 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Mem. Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn.
151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Dibblee v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah
2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961).
"Zipser, Liability for Negligence in Blood Transfusions, 16 FED'N OF INS. COUN. Q., Spring
1966, at 9.
"'Those authorities that have stated that a test exists for detection of the SH antigen are as
follows: 14 AM. JuR. PROOF oF FACTS Hepatitis § 23, at 149-51 (1964); Test Detects Hepatitis
Virus in Blood Samples, MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, Sept. 25, 1964, at 48; Garibaldi, A New Look
at Hospitals' Liability for Hepatitis Contaminated Blood on Principles of Strict Tort Liability, 48
CHICAGO B. REc. 204, 205 (1967); Medical Judgment v. Legal Doctrine in the Matter of Hepa-
fitis Contaminated Blood, 49 CHICAGO B. REC. 22 (1967).
Those authorities insisting that no such text exists are: Dunn, Blood Transfusions and Serum
Hepatitis, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 497 (1966); Habegger, supra note 8; Haut & Alter, supra
note 1; Thomas, supra note 1; VanWormer, supra note 1.
15 See note 12 supra.
" Garibaldi, supra note 14, at 206.
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detection of hepatitis virus." Also, they are not considered satisfactory.
While they would not eliminate all carriers of serum hepatitis as blood
donors, they would result in the rejection of approximately forty per cent
of all potential donors, only a small percentage of whom would be carriers
of the SH antigen." It would certainly not be practical to force such tests
on hospitals and blood banks when the maintenance of an adequate supply
of blood is already a widespread problem.
Despite the fact that suggested tests have not proved successful, signifi-
cant research has continued in the search for the elusive SH antigen. Re-
cently, several tests have been developed that may finally make detection
of this antigen possible. The one which appears most promising is the
"HIM" test. Those who have done extensive clinical research on the
"HIM" test feel that it "offers the definite possibility of being the solution
to the problem of the detection of viral hepatitis carriers among blood
donors."" The major problem that now exists with this test is that it,
like the tests discussed above, would cause the rejection of approximately
forty per cent of all potential blood donors."0 If the test can be made more
accurate through continued clinical evaluation, it may supply the badly
needed method of detection.
Until such time as the "HIM" test can be made more specific, some
authorities feel that a method now exists which can be effectively used to
screen potential blood donors. 1 Since there is some evidence that the serum
immunoglobulin level is increased for a period of time after a person has
had hepatitis, it is believed that an immunoglobulin assay test may provide
an effective screening device.2 Studies show that the main objection to
the "HIM" test, the rejection of a large percentage of potential donors, is
eliminated by the serum immunoglobulin test.' Preliminary study has
shown that although some potential donors would be rejected, this ob-
jection is outweighed by the advantage of eliminating a large number of
hepatitis virus carriers.' Even though those authorities who have conducted
studies feel that the test is a rapid, simple, and inexpensive method of
routinely screening prospective donors,' it would appear that further
studies must be conducted by others before any definite conclusion can be
drawn as to the test's effectiveness.
Other research, although yet not as encouraging as that done on the
"HIM" and immunoglobulin assay tests, has indicated a third possible
method for detection of the SH antigen in the blood of prospective donors.
Some relation has been found to exist between the Australia and SH anti-
'7 Medical Judgment v. Legal Doctrine in the Matter of Hepatitis Contaminated Blood, 49
CHICAGO B. REC. 22, 23 (1967).
18 Id.
1 Weaver, King, & Brown, A Clinical Evaluation of the "HIM" Test, 49 AM. J. CLINICAL
PATHOLOGY 647, 651 (1968).
20 Id.
21 Bevan, Taswell, & Gleich, Serum Immunoglobulin Levels in Blood Donors Implicated in
Transmission of Hepatitis, 203 J.A.M.A. 38 (1968).






gens" The findings suggest that the Australia and SH antigens are very
closely related and possibly identical." Since the Australia antigen is "more
specifically and sensitively detected and identified,"' a method may prove
effective for detection of the SH antigen if the relationship between the two
is established. However, much more research will be required to establish
conclusively such a relationship. "
Even though the effectiveness of any test for detection of the SH antigen
has not been conclusively established, medical research in this area should
not be considered static. Since research could find an adequate detection
method in the near future, the courts should not be reluctant to review
the advances made in the area when determining the liability of hospitals
and blood banks for transfusing blood contaminated with serum hepatitis.
Recent advances made by medical researchers make it mandatory that any
lawyer involved in this kind of litigation keep abreast of medical, as well
as legal, developments. Once an effective method of detection is estab-
lished, liability could easily be based on negligent failure to use such a
test. However, until such time, practitioners will have to look to some
other theory in order to hold hospitals and blood banks liable for the
transfusion of blood contaminated by the "elusive" antigen.
II. CATCH THEM IF YOU CAN-THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Since no test has been accepted by the courts as being capable of con-
clusively detecting hepatitis virus in the donor's blood, various theories
other than negligent non-detection of the virus have been advanced in
attempting to hold physicians, hospitals, and blood banks liable for in-
juries resulting from the transfusion of hepatitis-contaminated blood.
Thus far, none of the theories used has met with a great deal of success.
Statutory Violation. In only one reported case, Merck & Co. v. Kidd,"°
has a plaintiff attempted to base liability for transfusion of blood con-
taminated by the hepatitis virus upon a statutory violation. This single
attempt proved unsuccessful. In that case a patient who had contracted
serum hepatitis from a transfusion of pooled blood plasma sought to hold
the manufacturer of the plasma negligent per se for violation of the
Tennessee Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act." The Act provides that a drug
is adulterated if it consists in whole or in part of any filthy substance.
The issue of non-detectibility was most influential in the court's decision.
" Prince, Relation of Australia and SH Antigens, [1968] 2 THE LANCET 462.
27 Id.2 5 Id. at 463.
25 Other research projects are also.engaged in a search for a method to detect the hepatitis virus
in the blood or to destroy it in blood plasma. As yet, these studies have not advanced to a point
where they can be termed significant developments. A report of these projects can be found in
the following authorities:. Salsbury & Brozovich, Experience with a Hepatitis-Free Plasma Protein
Solution, [1968] 3 BRIT. MED. J. 352; Sumida, Okuyama, & Kamegai, Serum-Hepatitis from
Frozen Blood, [1967] 2 THE LANCET 1255; Turner & White, S.H. Antigens in Haemodialysis-
Associated Hepatitis, [1969] 2 THE LANCET 121.
as 2 4 2 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957).
"
1
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 52-101 to -124 (1951).
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The court held that since the serum hepatitis virus could not be seen even
with the most powerful microscope, could not be described, and its pres-
ence could not be known except for its ultimate result,2 the virus could
not be termed a "filthy substance" within the Act. Since there was no
statutory violation in the manufacture of the plasma, recovery was denied.
The lack of success in Merck should not discourage completely the use of
such theories. Although there was no statutory violation in that case, there
is a possibility that recovery could be based upon violation of a federal
statutory provision.' Also, in the event that the hepatitis virus is capable
of detection in the blood, the virus might well be termed a "filthy sub-
stance" under the Tennessee Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ' or any other
act similarly formulated.
Strict Liability in Tort. One theory of liability which has been put for-
ward only infrequently in litigation is the strict liability in tort of the
supplier or transfuser of contaminated blood. In the first reported case in
which this theory was advanced, Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital," it was
rejected. Although the court held a cause of action to be stated on other
grounds," it held that the blood bank which supplied the contaminated
blood could not be held liable under strict tort liability. In making this
determination, the court was influenced primarily by the fact that the
virus is not detectible in the blood of the donor. The court found that
the situation was governed by comment k of section 402-A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. Under this section, strict liability is not
imposed upon the seller of a product if it is "unavoidably unsafe.""a Be-
cause the virus could not be detected, the court found blood contaminated
by the hepatitis virus to fall within the "unavoidably unsafe" category,
and the seller was therefore not liable.
Despite Jackson, the landmark decision of Cunningham v. MacNeal
Memorial Hospital' held that the doctrine of strict tort liability was ap-
plicable to a serum hepatitis situation. In Cunningham an action was
brought against the hospital for injuries received by a patient who had
developed serum hepatitis as the result of several whole blood transfusions
received in the hospital. The hospital contended that it could not be held
liable because whole human blood is not a product, and because the trans-
fusing of human blood was a service rather than a sale. The court held
that the complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action. In holding
whole human blood to be a product, the court relied on the fact that it
32 242 F.2d at 596.
3a See note 39 infra, and accompanying text.34
TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-115 (1951).
5 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1967).
'Although the court refused to recognize strict liability in tort, it held that the furnishing
of blood by the blood bank was a "sale," and that the complaint therefore stated a cause of action
against the blood bank. 232 A.2d at 884.
aRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402-A, comment k, at 353 (1965).
38 113 Ill. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969).
1970]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
is considered as such for purposes of federal regulation of commerce."
Since blood was a product, the court held that the transfusion of it into
the possession of a patient was a "sale" to which the doctrine of strict
tort liability was applicable. In reaching its decision, the court refused
to consider the issue of detectibility, finding the question to be one for
the determination of the trial court upon remand of the case.
In holding the doctrine of strict tort liability to be applicable, the
court was strongly influenced by two cases. Suvada v. White Motor
Co."° established the doctrine of strict tort liability in Illinois, and
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital"' abolished any
immunity previously enjoyed by Illinois hospitals. The court in Cun-
ningham stated that it appeared that recovery against hospitals had
been denied in other jurisdictions because of the belief that doctors, hos-
pitals, and blood banks were entitled to preferential treatment under the
law because of their meritorious services. Since Darling completely abolished
such preferential treatment, the court felt compelled not to ignore recog-
nized doctrines, as other jurisdictions had, in order to avoid holding a
hospital liable.
Because Cunningham was decided recently, there is no indication whether
it will be followed by other jurisdictions. However, it represents a signifi-
cant breakthrough in serum hepatitis liability. Until such time as a method
of detecting the hepatitis virus in the blood is established, Cunningham
will no doubt represent the attorney's most valuable tool in the quest to
hold physicians, hospitals, and blood banks liable for transfusing contami-
nated blood.
Negligence. As might well be expected, the first reported case involving
serum hepatitis injury attempted to establish liability on the basis of
negligence. In Parker v. State4' the recipient of a pooled plasma transfusion'
died as the result of serum hepatitis contracted through the transfusion.
The decedent's administratrix brought an action for negligence against
the state, which had distributed the pooled plasma to the hospital at the
request of the Red Cross. The action was based on the theory that the
state, as distributor, was negligent in failing to warn the physicians who
would be using the pooled plasma of the danger that it might contain the
hepatitis virus. In affirming a dismissal of the action, the court held that
the state had a right to assume that a hospital authorized to use the plasma
"
5 See In re Community Blood Bank of the Kansas City Area, Inc., No. 8519, 22,023 (F.T.C.
June 8, 1964); United States v. Steinschreiber, 218 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States
v. Calise, 217 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
40 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
4'33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.d 253 (1965).
42201 Misc. 416, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd, 280 App. Div. 157, 112 N.Y.S.2d
695 appeal denied, 280 App. Div. 901, 109 N.E.2d 474, 115 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1952).
.' The transfusing of pooled blood plasma greatly increases the risk of serum hepatitis trans-
mission and is therefore usually done only under strict emergency conditions. The increased risk
from the use of pooled plasma results from the fact that it consists of blood plasma taken from
many donors. If any one donor in the group has the hepatitis virus in his blood, the virus can be
transmitted through the transfusion.
44Parker v. State, 280 App. Div. 157, 109 N.E.2d 474, 112 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1952).
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would be aware of the danger and would use sound medical judgment in
its transfusion. Therefore, the state was not liable for failure to warn.
Even though they were not parties to the action, the court also discussed
the possible liability of the hospital and its agent, the physician who ordered
the transfusion, for negligent use of the pooled plasma. The court found
that neither could have been held liable because of the emergency situation
that existed. (The patient had suffered a cerebral concussion.) In such an
emergency, the risk of using the pooled plasma was not as great as the risk
of failing to administer it.
In its decision in Parker, the court seemed to have established an un-
fortunate trend-denying the liability of all parties connected with the
transfusing of blood contaminated with serum hepatitis. This trend, at
least, endured in actions based on negligence. The second reported serum
hepatitis case based solely on negligence, Hiddy v. State," also denied lia-
bility. Again, this was an action against the state for negligence as distrib-
utor of pooled, unirradiated blood plasma. A patient who had received a
plasma transfusion died as the result of serum hepatitis. The court, relying
on Parker, held that the state, as distributor, was not negligent because the
pooled plasma had many advantages despite its inherent dangers.' How-
ever, the court clearly implied that the physician who had ordered the
plasma could be held liable for negligence. In this case, as distinguished
from Parker, no emergency existed to justify the use of the pooled plasma.
The patient had been in the hospital for fifteen hours, thus giving ample
time to "type" the blood. Also, an adequate supply of whole blood was
available for transfusion. Under these conditions the physician was negli-
gent in ordering a transfusion of pooled plasma rather than whole blood.
However, the hospital and its agent-physician could no longer be held
liable because of the statute of limitations.
Fischer v. Wilmington General Hospital,7 the only reported case based
solely on negligence in the transfusion of whole blood, also denied liability,
even though the action was against the hospital and physician and based
on a theory of negligence different from those previously used. In Fischer
the injured patient alleged that the hospital was negligent in not testing the
blood for foreign substances, in failing to warn the patient that the blood
might contain viruses when the hospital should have known that the
danger existed, and in failing to exercise care in obtaining the blood from
a source not likely to be infected by the virus. The court held that there
could be no negligence in failing to test the blood since there was no
known method of detection. Also, the hospital was not shown by the
evidence to be negligent in obtaining the blood from a blood bank. How-
ever, the court did find that the hospital would be liable if it knew that the
'5207 Misc. 207, 137 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Ct. Cl. 1955), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 644, 151 N.Y.S.2d
621 (1956).
' The main advantage of plasma is that it can be used to replace body fluid in an emergency
situation where there is not time to type the blood of the patient. There is no danger of plasma
causing an incompatibility reaction. However, the same advantage can be attained through the use
of plasma from a single donor as well as through the use of pooled plasma.
4 51 Del. 554, 149 A.2d 749 (1959).
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blood bank was not using due care in the selection of donors. Although these
findings were significant, the most important aspect of Fischer was the
court's holding that there was no duty of the hospital or physician to warn
the patient of the risk of contracting serum hepatitis as the result of a
blood transfusion. Since the risk of hepatitis virus transmission was slight
compared with the risk in not administering the blood, and since it was
not the general practice in the immediate medical community to warn of
such dangers, there was no negligence in failing to warn the patient. Also,
the court accepted the argument that to warn the patient might have an
adverse psychological effect that would lessen the chances of recovery.
The holding that there was no duty to warn seems especially significant
because of its continued acceptance by the courts.'
Although actions based solely on negligence in serum hepatitis trans-
fusion cases have been far from successful, the value of this theory of
liability in such cases should not be overlooked. The language in Hiddy
shows that the courts may, under the proper circumstances, hold physicians
liable for negligence in transfusing contaminated blood. More important
is the fact that when medical science finally devises an effective test for
detecting the SH antigen, negligence will probably be the primary theory
of recovery in actions against hospitals and blood banks which fail to
detect the antigen.
Implied Warranty. Most of the litigation involving the question of lia-
bility for the transfusion of hepatitis-contaminated blood has been founded
upon a theory of breach of implied warranty. The landmark decision that
first decided this question, Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital," has had
a more profound effect upon this area than any other case. In Perlmutter
a patient who contracted serum hepatitis brought an action against the
hospital for the resulting injuries. The complaint did not allege negligence.
Instead, the action was predicated on the theory that the supplying of blood
by the hospital for $60 a pint was a "sale" within the Sales Act,"' and that
the warranties of reasonable fitness for purpose and merchantable quality
attached to the transaction. The patient alleged that these warranties were
breached because of the hepatitis virus in the blood, and that the hospital
was thereby strictly liable for any resulting injuries.
In reaching its decision the court held that the supplying of blood by the
hospital was a "service" rather than a "sale." Since there was no sale, no
warranties attached to the transaction, and the hospital could not be held
liable under such a theory. The court reasoned that "it was not for blood-
or iodine or bandages-for which plaintiff bargained, but the wherewithal
of the hospital staff and the availability of hospital facilities to provide
whatever medical treatment was considered advisable."51 Even though the
complaint was held not to state a cause of action for breach of implied
4 See cases cited in Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964).
49308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
"°N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96 (McKinney 1962).
as 123 N.E.2d at 795.
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warranty, the court noted that the hospital could be held liable if it were
negligent in failing to detect or destroy the hepatitis virus in the blood.
This holding seems to have been mere surplusage, since the court also found
that there was no possible method to detect or destroy the virus. Even
though the court did not admit it, the lack of an effective method of de-
tection seems to have influenced its decision.
However, there was a lack of unanimity in Perlmutter. Three of the
seven judges who heard the case expressed, in an extremely strong dissent,"
their opinion that the supplying of blood by the hospital was a "sale"
within the Uniform Sales Act, and that the hospital was therefore liable
for breach of implied warranty. Although the majority rejected the argu-
ment with little discussion, the dissenters found the situation analogous to
the serving of food in a restaurant. Since the serving of food was a "sale"
of goods under the Sales Act, the dissent could not find any reason for
distinguishing, as a "service," the supplying of blood by a hospital. They
found that receiving blood transfusions from a hospital for $60 a pint
was just as much a purchase of goods as the consumption of food in a
restaurant.
Despite the closeness of the decision in Perlmutter, the strong dissent,""
and the frequent criticism that has been made of the case, 4 many juris-
dictions have followed it without question." Also, the reasoning of Perl-
mutter has been extended by some jurisdictions to hold the "service"
theory applicable to the furnishing of hepatitis-contaminated blood by
charitable blood banks,5 and even by a commercial blood bank. 7 In all
of these cases the results have been consistently the same-the denial of
recovery to the innocent recipient of "tainted" blood."
52 Id. at 796.
5a Id.
"' Note, Sales-Implied Warranties-Action for Breach of Implied Warranties of Quality Not
Maintainable Against Hospital that Furnished Impure Blood to Patient, 69 HARV. L. REv. 391
(1955); Note, Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 MINN. L. REV. 640 (1958); Note,
Sales-Implied Warranty-No Warranty in Blood Transfusion by Hospital, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW.
565 (1962); Note, Sales-Breach of Warranty-Supplying of Blood by Hospital Not a Sale, 29
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 305 (1955).
22 Sloneker v. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Whitehurst v. American
Nat'l Red Cross, I Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965); White v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp.
Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968); Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156
S.E.2d 923 (1967); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Mem. Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132
N.W.2d 805 (1965); Dibblee v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364
P.2d 1085 (1961) (action for wrongful death due to incompatibility reaction); Gile v. Kennewick
Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956) (case involving incompatibility reac-
tion); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
Texas has also adopted the reasoning of Perlmutter in Goelz v. J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Re-
search Inst. & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), error ref. n.r.e. However,
the language approving the Perlmutter decision was mere dicta, since the action was against a
blood bank for the negligence of its employees in furnishing the wrong type of blood. This case
did not involve the question of breach of an implied warranty. But see note 58 infra.
asWhitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965); Balko-
witsch v. Minneapolis War Mem. Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965);
Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
27 Krom v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 761, 180 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1958).
28 The substantial impact of Perlmutter is further evidenced by the fact that three jurisdictions,
including Texas, have enacted statutory provisions which follow the holding of the case. TEX. Bus.
& COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(e) (1968): "The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
shall not be applicable to the furnishing of human blood, blood plasma, or other human tissue or
organs from a blood bank or reservoir of tissue or organs. Such blood, blood plasma or tissue or
1970]
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III. A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION-BUT SOME REFUSE To FOLLOW
The Perlmutter decision was one of the most unfortunate in the past
several years. Because the court seemed to find that as a matter of public
policy the hospital should not be held liable for transfusing "bad blood,"
it invented the artificial "service-sale" distinction to implement this public
policy decision. It would have been better if the court had simply held
that the hospital was not liable because of public policy considerations, for
the "service-sale" dichotomy fails to withstand analysis.
No matter what approach is taken, there seems to be no valid reason
for distinguishing between the sale of food in a restaurant and the trans-
fusing of blood by a hospital, especially in those instances where the pa-
tient is charged a price for the blood that is above the hospital's cost.
Merely to state that the buyer contracts for a product in the first instance
and for services in the latter, does not draw a valid distinction, and cer-
tainly does not explain why such a distinction should even be made. Since
it is widely held that the serving of food in a restaurant is a sale to which
either implied warranties" or strict tort liability"o attaches, the same result
should arise from the transfusing of "bad" blood by a hospital.
Besides the faulty reasoning which is apparent in Perlmutter when it is
compared with adulterated food cases, the same state which decided Perl-
mutter has since rendered several decisions that point out the weakness of
the holding." In these cases the courts found, in distinguishing Perlmutter,
that a cause of action could be stated against a hospital for breach of
express warranty in the transfusing of blood which resulted in the patient
suffering an incompatability reaction. It would seem impossible to defend
the position taken by these courts that the transfusing of blood by a hos-
pital can be a "sale" for the purpose of determining breach of an express
warranty and yet, at the same time, be a "service" for the purpose of de-
termining whether an implied warranty of fitness or merchantability
attaches to the transaction. The reasoning of these cases clearly points out
the weakness of the Perlmutter decision.
Perlmutter, however, was not the actual step in the wrong direction.
More unfortunate were the many decisions that accepted its reasoning
blindly without questioning the policy considerations that were involved."e
Even worse were the decisions that extended the fallacious reasoning to
apply to cases involving the liability of blood banks for supplying con-
taminated blood.' Fortunately, not all courts applied or extended the
organs shall not for the purpose of this Title be considered commodities subject to sale or barter,
but shall be considered as medical services." See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (1956);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 1606 (West 1955).
9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE art. 2, §§ 2-314, -315.
°"See the cases collected in W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS S 97, at 675 nn.53-69 (3d ed.
1964).
"'Payton v. Brooklyn Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 898, 252 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1964), afl'd, 19
N.Y.2d 610, 224 N.E.2d 891, 278 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1967); Cheshire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n,
53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Napoli v. Saint Peter's Hosp., 213 N.Y.S.2d
6 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
62 See note 55 supra.
63 See note 56 supra.
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Perlmutter doctrine merely because it seemed to be an established, irre-
versible trend.
The first state to recognize the fallacy of Perlmutter was Florida. In
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc." the propriety of extending Perl-
mutter to apply to the supplying of blood by a blood bank was questioned.
Russell involved an action by a hospital patient against the blood bank
which had supplied blood to the hospital. The patient contracted serum
hepatitis from the blood. In her action against the blood bank, the patient
sought recovery on the ground that there had been a breach of the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose, since the blood was
impure. Since there were no Florida cases on point, the trial court looked
to the decisions in other jurisdictions. As a result, the court held that the
transfer of blood by a blood bank or hospital was a service to which no
implied warranties attached. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed."
The court of appeals, in reversing the decision of the trial court, held that
the supplying of blood to the patient by a blood bank, for a consideration,
was a sale to which the resulting implied warranties attached."
In finding that the transaction between the blood bank and the patient
was a sale, the court relied on Florida's rejection of the service theory in
the sale of food by a restaurant." Even though the court approved the
Perlmutter service theory as it applies to hospitals, the court found, de-
spite authority to the contrary," that this service theory should not be
extended to transactions between a patient and a blood bank. The court
found that the authorities that had so extended Perlmutter did so because
of a finding that the hepatitis virus could not be detected in the blood.
According to the court, "[t]he rationale of the cases denying liability
seems to be ... that the defect which causes the harmful virus in the
blood cannot be detected and therefore it is against public policy to hold
hospitals and blood banks strictly liable when they are supplying a com-
modity essential to health." 9 The public policy argument was insufficient
to persuade the court to ignore the analogy between a restaurant and a
blood bank.
After determining that the transaction was a sale to which implied
warranties attached and that a cause of action was stated against the
blood bank for breach of implied warranty, the court qualified its hold-
ing. Persuaded by the argument that the product might be "unavoidably
unsafe,"7 the court held that as a matter of law the patient could "only
recover for injuries if they were caused by the failure to detect or remove
a deleterious substance capable of detection or removal."7' Although the
64 1 8 5 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
65Id. at 750.
"Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
'Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949).
55 Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Mem. Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805
(1965); Dibblee v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 17 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085
(1961).
69 185 So. 2d at 753.
"
0 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402-A, comment k (1965).
7' 185 So. 2d at 755.
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burden of proof was on the blood bank to show that no test existed which
could detect or remove the virus, proof that the virus could not be re-
moved or detected was held to be a defense to breach of implied warranty.
Since the record of the case did not contain a showing that the defect was
undetectable, the court remanded the case for further consideration.
The Russell case was taken under consideration by the Supreme Court
of Florida by grant of a writ of certiorari.' On this appeal, the holding
that the transaction was a sale rather than a service was affirmed with the
characterization that it was "eminently correct." However, the supreme
court did not agree that undetectibility would be a defense to breach of
implied warranty. In fact, the court stated that this issue should not have
even been considered. It was held that the question of detectibility was
one of fact and that it was error for the court of appeals to consider the
issue merely because the trial court had done so in going beyond the con-
trolling question. Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the decision only
in so far as it determined the transaction to be a sale subject to implied
warranties.
A significant point in the supreme court's determination of Russell was
the concurring opinion of Justice Roberts." The majority opinion stated
that allowing undetectibility as a defense to breach of implied warranty
was in direct conflict with the case of Green v. American Tobacco Co.74
and did not consider the point further. Justice Roberts felt the issue was
important enough to warrant expansion. According to his concurrence,
the holding of the court of appeals, that only injuries resulting from fail-
ure to detect a substance capable of detection would establish liability, was
not only in direct conflict with Green and other Florida cases,"a but also
ran "counter to the very basis of the strict or implied warranty theory of
liability. ' "" Justice Roberts believed that the blood bank should be liable
even if the virus could not be detected, for detectibility was not an issue
relevant to the determination of liability for breach of implied warranty.
The statements of Justice Roberts, considered with the majority state-
ment that the finding of the court of appeals was in direct conflict with
Green, may imply that in the future the Florida supreme court will not
consider detectibility to be an issue in similar actions against blood banks.
During the same year that the Florida supreme court decided the Russell
case, a Florida court of appeals was presented with the same question in
Hoder v. Sayet." Hoder was an action against both a commercial blood
bank and a hospital for the death of a patient allegedly caused by hepatitis-
contaminated blood. The commercial blood bank supplied the blood to the
72 Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
lId. at 118.
74154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
" Kenower v. Hotels Statler Co., 124 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1942); Florida Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Jordan, 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1953); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19
So. 2d 313 (1944); Wagner v. Mars, Inc., 166 So. 2d 673 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964). All of these cases
establish that a deleterious substance that is incapable of detection in a product can result in
liability of the seller of the product for the injuries which it causes.
'6 196 So. 2d at 119.
77 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
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hospital and the hospital administered the transfusion. Breach of warranty
and negligence were alleged against both defendants. The court, relying
on Russell, held that the transaction was a sale as regarding the blood
bank, but a service as regarding the hospital. In so finding, the court held
that a cause of action was stated against both the hospital and the blood
bank for negligence, but only against the blood bank for breach of im-
plied warranty. The court stated that undetectibility would probably be
a defense for breach of implied warranty, but this statement was of
doubtful validity considering the supreme court's opinion in Russell. The
court did, however, go one step further than Russell. Even if serum hepa-
titis could not be detected, the court found that the risk of its presence
could be greatly minimized through the selection of donors. The blood
bank was held to be under a duty of care in its selection of donors." Even
if the blood was "unavoidably unsafe," this did not "license its processor
to disregard all standards of care and precaution, merely because he is
secure in the knowledge that he does not impliedly warrant it against its
,unavoidable' defects."7 Thus, even if it were found that no implied war-
ranty existed because of undetectibility, the blood bank could still be
liable for negligent screening of donors.
In Hoder a theory of liability was also alleged that had never been pre-
viously attempted. The plaintiff contended that it was negligence per se
for a hospital to obtain blood from a commercial blood bank because com-
mercial procurement increases the chances of the blood being infected with
hepatitis. Although various studies have shown that commercial blood
banks have a higher incidence of infected blood, 0 the court rejected the
plaintiff's contention. As long as such blood banks continue to supply a
major portion of all blood used, it is doubtful that any court would accept
such an argument. To do so would effectively preclude hospitals from
obtaining blood from commercial sources, and thus dangerously reduce the
supply of available blood.
The second state to recognize the fallacy of Perlmutter was New Jersey.
In Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital" the court not only held that the
supplying of blood by a blood bank was a sale, but went even further
to hold that the transfusion of blood into the human body by a hospital
for a consideration was also a sale. Thus, for the first time, Perlmutter was
absolutely rejected and transfusions given by a hospital were held to be
sales to which implied warranties attached.
Jackson involved actions brought by the husband and his wife, a patient
who had contracted serum hepatitis, against the hospital which had trans-
fused the blood and the two blood banks which had supplied it. The actions
were based on strict liability, breach of implied warranty of merchant-
"s In Hoder the duty of care a blood bank must exercise in selecting donors was especially sig-
nificant, since the evidence showed that one donor had given a fictitious name and another was
not questioned about his medical history.
79 196 So. 2d at 209.
so Haut & Alter, supra note 1; Somayaji, Stone, & Glover, Risk of Anicteric Hepatitis Following
Blood Transfusions, 8 GUT 614 (1967).
8' 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1967).
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ability, breach of express warranty, and negligence. The hospital and one
of the blood banks moved for summary judgment on all claims. While
granting summary judgment on the claims based on strict liability and
breach of implied warranty, the superior court refused the same relief on
the claims based on breach of express warranty and negligence. As far as
implied warranties were concerned, the court found that a disclaimer of
implied warranties on each unit of blood was effective under the Uniform
Commercial Code." However, this disclaimer raised an express warranty
that the blood bank would use "utmost care" in the selection of donors.
The court refused to grant summary judgment as to the express warranty
because the record did not show whether the blood bank had exercised this
degree of care. If the plaintiffs could show on remand that this express
warranty had been breached, they would be entitled to recover. As to the
question of strict liability, the court granted summary judgment on the
basis that since the product was "unavoidably unsafe"" because the virus
was undetectible, strict liability should not be applied.
The New Jersey supreme court reversed and remanded for determination
whether strict liability should be imposed and whether any of the parties
were negligent in procuring or transfusing the blood."4 Although upholding
the decision in other respects, the court found the record insufficient to
hold strict liability inapplicable. Before deciding an issue of such signifi-
cance, the court stated that it would require findings based on detailed
expert testimony on the issues of detectibility, the incidence of hepatitis
in blood received by commercial blood banks as compared to other sources,
and economic and related factors bearing on the public policy issues in-
volved. These requirements are significant in that they would permit a
court to go outside the confines of the Restatement of Torts5 in determin-
ing whether strict liability should apply. This appears to be an approach
never before taken by any court." It is too early to determine whether or
not other courts will reject the "Perlmutter fallacy" and follow the trend
established by these recent decisions. At the very least, these cases should
point out the flaws in the Perlmutter reasoning to any jurisdiction faced
with a similar set of facts. The reign of the "service" theory may well be
approaching its end.
IV. TEXAS' OPPORTUNITY: A SUGGESTED APPROACH
One Texas case, decided before the adoption of section 2.316 (e) of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code,"S has accepted the Perlmutter service
82 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE art. 2, § 2-136. Each unit of blood which the patient received
contained the following disclaimer: "Despite utmost care in the selection of donors, human blood
may contain the virus of homologous serum hepatitis. Therefore Eastern Blood Bank does not war-
rant against its presence in this blood." 232 A.2d at 882.
8 3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402-A, comment k. (1965).
" Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
"2 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402-A, comment k (1965).
86See, e.g., Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Russell v. Community Blood
Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749, modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War
Mem. Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp.,
96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1967).
S 1T~x. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(e) (1968); see note 58 supra.
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theory as being applicable to blood banks." This acceptance is neither
authoritative nor binding on future decisions. The statement accepting this
theory was merely dicta in an opinion by the Dallas court of civil appeals.9
Therefore, when a Texas court is presented with a case where liability for
serum hepatitis transmitted by blood transfusion is actually at issue, the
decision will be the first to apply section 2.316(e). The opportunity to
decide such a case is very likely to arise in the near future.
In Villarreal v. Santa Rosa Medical Center"° an action was instituted
by a paying patient against a charitable hospital to recover for injuries
from serum hepatitis allegedly contracted from a transfusion of adulterated
blood. The trial court entered a take-nothing summary judgment on the
ground that, under the doctrine of charitable immunity, a non-profit
hospital corporation could not be held liable for the torts of its agents.
The San Antonio court of civil appeals reversed and remanded without
considering the question of liability for serum hepatitis. While recognizing
that the charitable immunity doctrine had been used in Texas to bar re-
covery against such institutions, " the court held that it should no longer
be applied. In so holding, the court relied on Watkins v. Southcrest Bap-
tist Church,' in which a majority of the Supreme Court of Texas declared
an intention not to be bound by the charitable immunity doctrine in
actions arising subsequent to that case." The court of civil appeals dis-
tinguished other cases that had applied the charitable immunity doctrine
in actions decided after Watkins, and found that they were under a duty
to follow the intention declared by a majority of the supreme court.
If the Supreme Court of Texas affirms the abolishment of the charitable
immunity doctrine in Villarreal, as it probably will if the case is appealed,'
then the issue of liability for the transfusion of contaminated blood will
have to be decided for the first time. Even if the doctrine of charitable
immunity is not abolished on that appeal, the serum hepatitis issue could
SaGoelz v. J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961), error ref. n.r.e.
s Goelz did not even involve the issue of serum hepatitis liability. The action was one solely
for injuries caused by a transfusion of incompatible blood. Since the defendant blood bank was a
charitable institution, the case was decided entirely on the basis of charitable immunity from tort
liability enjoyed by such institutions in Texas. The court also held that since the blood was not
actually defective, no implied warranties would have been breached even if the transaction had
been held a sale. Any injuries caused resulted from the negligence of defendant's agents in mis-
labeling the blood rather than from an inherent defect.
0443 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
"' See Southern Methodist Univ. v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943), cited at
443 S.W.2d at 623.
02 399 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1966).
" Although Watkins upheld the charitable immunity doctrine, it is obvious from the opinion
that considerable dissatisfaction existed in regard to its continued application. While four justices
felt it should be applied in the future, one stated that he would abolish it in all cases arising after
Watkins, two stated they would reconsider the doctrine in future cases, and two stated in a dis-
senting opinion that they would abolish it immediately.
"Since the Watkins case was decided, the chances that the charitable immunity doctrine will
be abolished may have increased. Two of those who favored continued future application, Justices
Norvell and Griffin, have subsequently retired from the court and have been succeeded by Justices
Reavley and McGee. Although the views of Justices Reavley and McGee are not certain, one or
both may favor abrogation. In any event, even if the doctrine is not completely abolished, the
court may accept a proposal by Justice Greenhill to apply the doctrine in the future only in favor
of churches, and to hold all other charitable institutions liable in tort. See Greenhill, Should Gov-
ernmental Immunity for Torts Be Re-examined, and, If So, By Whom?, 31 TEX. B.J. 1036 (1968).
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possibly arise in some other situation.5 In any event, when the issue does
arise, the courts will be faced with a complex and controversial decision.
The following is a suggested approach which Texas lawyers and courts
might employ. Included is an approach that should be taken by those
jurisdictions that have not enacted provisions comparable to section
2.316(e).
Liability of Physicians. The liability of physicians and surgeons should
not be based upon any theories of implied warranty or strict liability. Any
liability of a physician for transfusing contaminated blood should be found-
ed upon negligence, as in any other medical malpractice situation. Of all the
parties involved in the transfusing of blood, the physician has the least
control over its quality. It is usually supplied for his use by the hospital,
which itself determines its source. However, the physician is the party
that determines when transfusion is necessary. As such, he should be held
liable for his negligent ordering of a transfusion. And, since a physician
should know of the dangers attendant in the use of blood transfusions,
he should be liable for any injuries, including contraction of serum hepa-
titis, which are proximately caused by the negligent ordering of a blood
transfusion.
Although a blood transfusion can be a highly effective therapeutic de-
vice, its use is not indicated in all instances. In fact, the indiscriminate use
of blood transfusions has been characterized as "playing Russian roulette
with bottles of blood instead of a revolver. While the odds are in the
physician's favor . . . , the patient takes the risk."'" The use of blood
transfusions is a proper device only in certain instances: (1) to replace
whole blood that has been lost, (2) to maintain or improve the hemo-
globin level, (3) to improve coagulation of the blood, and (4) to provide
protein or iron.9" However, even in these situations the factors necessitat-
ing a blood transfusion must be evaluated on an individual basis.
The most common use of blood transfusions is to replace blood that has
been lost. Where the loss of blood is substantial, this is the proper treat-
ment. Whether or not blood is needed is determined by the patient's con-
dition and his blood volume, the latter being easily measured. 8 Since a
patient, under some conditions, can lose up to 500 cc. of blood with no
adverse effects, the use of a blood transfusion, even during surgery, is not
always necessary. Therefore, if a patient contracts serum hepatitis because
of the negligent ordering of an unnecessary transfusion, the physician
should be liable for the resultant death or injury to the patient.
Although not as prevalent as the transfusion to replace blood loss, the
use of blood transfusions to maintain or improve the hemoglobin, or oxygen-
" Even if the charitable immunity doctrine is applied fully in the future, the issue could still
arise in an action brought against a physician, a commercial hospital clinic, or a commercial blood
bank.
"Crosby, Misuse of Blood Transfusions, 13 BLOOD 1198, 1200 (1958), cited in VanWormer,
supra note 1, at 68 n.2.
97 VanWormer, supra note 1, at 58-63.
98 Id. at 59.
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carrying capacity of the blood, is becoming increasingly common." Again,
certain factors must be taken into consideration in determining when its
use is justified. The age of the patient, blood volume level, and other
conditions which may complicate the anemia must be considered."' Also,
controversy exists concerning when a patient needs to be given blood to
raise the hemoglobin level when he is to undergo anesthesia.'' As in the
case of blood replacement, if it can be shown that the physician was
negligent in ordering an unnecessary transfusion, he should be held liable
for any injuries that result if the blood was contaminated.
Unlike the blood replacement and hemoglobin maintenance situations,
the use of blood to enhance coagulation or to provide protein or iron is
rarely justified.'0" Before the use of a transfusion is justified to enhance
coagulation, the cause of the bleeding must be determined and complex
differences in the viability of various clotting factors must be considered.
Blood transfusion may be the proper treatment to enhance coagulation
under certain circumstances." ' On the other hand, the use of whole blood
transfusions to provide protein or iron is justified only in rare instances.
Since other injected and oral preparations can achieve the same result, blood
should not be used merely to promote healing or as a tonic to make the
patient feel better.'
Since the use of blood transfusions is not always justified, it is clear
that a physician may be negligent in ordering a transfusion when it is not
needed. There is no reason why the physician should not be held to a duty
of due care in making this determination. To hold physicians liable for
serum hepatitis transmitted through transfusions which are not medically
justified would place them under no more onerous a burden than to sub-
ject them to liability for any form of medical malpractice. Also, there is
little danger that subjection to such liability would discourage physicians
from using needed blood transfusions, since they would merely be held
liable for the injuries resulting from negligently ordered transfusions.
Liability of Hospitals. If the charitable immunity doctrine as it applies to
hospitals is abolished in Texas, then all hospitals should be held liable, at
least for their negligence in the transfusing of blood contaminated with
serum hepatitis virus. The only manner in which hospitals could be held
liable for negligence would be if they did not use due care in selecting
the source or sources from which they received human blood. Even though
some authorities contend that the risk of receiving contaminated blood
is much greater when obtained from commercial sources, 0 ' it is doubtful
that the courts would accept the argument that such procurement is
negligence per se. "' To so hold would reduce the supply of available
99 Id.
'00Id. at 59-60.
101 Id. at 59.
'o' Id. at 62-63.
103 Id. at 62.
'04Id. at 63.
100 Haut & Alter, supra note 1; Somayaji, Stone, & Glover, supra note 80.
'
00 See Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
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blood to a dangerous level. A hospital, therefore, should be held liable for
negligent procurement only if it should have known that the source from
which it obtained blood was not using all possible due care in the selection
of donors. This could be proved by showing an unusually high rate of
contaminated blood coming to the hospital from this source, or by show-
ing that the hospital was familiar with the source's donor-selection pro-
cedure. Absent such proof, the hospital should not be held liable under
a theory of negligence.
Liability of hospitals based on negligence is not as desirable as holding
hospitals to strict tort liability for administering transfusions of con-
taminated blood. But, since Texas accepts the "Perlmutter fallacy" that
such a transfusion is a service, this would preclude strict tort liability."7 If
the Texas legislature can be persuaded to reject the theory that this consti-
tutes a service, the doctrine of strict tort liability could be applied. This
doctrine would be preferable in that it would place the burden of such in-
juries upon the hospital, which controls the source of the blood and may
insure against liability, rather than upon the patient.
Those jurisdictions that have refused to apply the doctrine of strict
tort liability to serum hepatitis cases have done so because of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 402-A, comment k."~ It is submitted, how-
ever, that these cases have misinterpreted this authority as it applies to
serum hepatitis contamination of blood. Section 402-A states that the
doctrine of strict tort liability applies to one who sells a "defective" product
that is "unreasonably dangerous" to its user or consumer, and comment k,
which accompanies that section, states that an "unavoidably unsafe"
product is not one which can be termed "unreasonably dangerous. '
107 Before strict tort liability can be applied, the person sought to be held liable must be a
"seller" of a "product." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402-A (1965).
... Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966); Jackson v.
Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1967).
'09RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Or TORTS § 402-A (1965) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm there-
by caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule is Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Comment k/ to this section states:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding ex-
ample is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease
itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vac-
cine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which
they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper direc-
tions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is
true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason
cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because
of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no
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"Unavoidably unsafe" products are described as those which "in the
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe
for their intended and ordinary use."...0
This characterization of "unavoidably unsafe" products should not be
applied to units of blood contaminated by serum hepatitis. Blood is not
a product which is incapable of being made safe for ordinary use. Although
there is no adequate means of detecting the virus, blood can be made
reasonably safe for its intended use by employing detailed medical his-
tories as a device to screen prospective donors."' Thus, while it cannot be
made completely safe, it can be made reasonably safe through effective
use of the donor-screening device. Comment k does not require that a
product be capable of being made completely safe, and other areas to which
strict tort liability has been applied would certainly not meet such a
rigorous standard."3
The fallacy of using comment k as a basis not to apply strict liability
to hospitals in serum hepatitis cases is further shown by the example which
the comment uses. The vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies is given
as an example of an "unavoidably unsafe" product. However, this vaccine
does not contain any deleterious agents. The possible adverse effects of the
vaccine are the result of its very nature when properly prepared. The same
is not true of blood contaminated by serum hepatitis. When properly pre-
pared, it should not result in adverse effects. The product does contain a
deleterious material, and it is this deleterious virus, not the nature of the
product, that causes the injury. It therefore appears that hepatitis-
contaminated blood is not the type of product to which comment k refers
to as being "unavoidably unsafe." Rather than applying comment k, hos-
pitals should be placed within the realm of strict tort liability under section
402-A, comment c."' This section states that public policy requires "the
burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption
be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of pro-
duction against which liability insurance can be obtained . .. .,1
While the imposition of strict tort liability upon hospitals may seem
harsh, it is not as severe as placing the burden of loss entirely on the
patient who receives a transfusion. This is especially true when the hospital
is charging the patient for the blood and thereby realizing a profit. It is
only equitable that the hospital bear the burden of loss through the pur-
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as
there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they
are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation
calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending
their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
110 Id.
..' See Boland, Strict Liability in Tort for Transfusing Contaminated Blood, 23 ARK. L. REV.
236, 249 (1969); Haut & Alter, supra note 1, at 559; Weaver, King, & Brown, A Clinical Evalu-
ation of the "HIM" Test, 49 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 647 (1968).
112 See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS S 97 (3d ed. 1964).
... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402-A, comment c (1965).
114 Id. at 350.
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chase of liability insurance, rather than place the entire burden on those
patients who are unfortunate enough to contract serum hepatitis through
a transfusion of contaminated blood.
Liability of Blood Banks. As in situations involving physicians and hos-
pitals, blood banks should be held liable for their negligence in the serum
hepatitis situation. Probably the only sound basis upon which an action
against a blood bank for negligence could be based would be for a failure
to use due care in the selection of donors. Even though no specific test
exists to detect the SH antigen in a donor's blood, the incidence of serum
hepatitis can be greatly reduced by the use of detailed medical histories as
a donor-screening device."' While donor screening would not completely
eliminate the risk of hepatitis-contaminated blood, it would clearly be
negligent for the blood bank to fail to reduce the risk of contamination as
much as possible through the routine use of approved, donor-screening
devices. Especially in the case of commercial blood banks, which are con-
sidered to have a higher incidence of contamination,"' it would be negli-
gent for the blood bank to fail to use a record-keeping technique, in
addition to using the medical-history device. Since many of the donors
for commercial sources give blood frequently to obtain money, the blood
bank should keep detailed records on all its habitual donors. By using this
technique, any donor who evinces a frequent connection with serum
hepatitis cases could be permanently excluded. Such exclusion would no
doubt greatly reduce the incidence of serum hepatitis in blood received
from commercial sources.
Liability of blood banks based solely on negligence is certainly not as
sound as liability based upon breach of implied warranties which attach
to a sale of goods." ' To hold that the transfer of blood by a blood bank
to a hospital or patient is a "service," is even more ridiculous than so
characterizing a transfer from a hospital to a patient. In the case of the
blood bank, there is absolutely no element of a service function upon
which such a characterization can be based. The blood bank procures the
blood, processes it, and then transfers it to the hospital or patient for a con-
sideration. Such a transaction cannot be logically held to be anything but a
sale. Once the transaction is properly so held, the implied warranties of
merchantability"'S and fitness for a particular purpose'. would attach. Upon
breach of one of these warranties because of the presence of serum hepatitis
virus, the blood bank would be liable to the patient for injuries suffered as
the result of contracting the disease.
It is only proper that blood banks be held to such a strict standard of
liability for dispensing contaminated blood. Of all the parties involved in
the blood transfusion process, the blood bank has the highest degree of
control over the quality of the blood, since it is responsible for the initial
115 See authorities cited in note I II supra.
1o See authorities cited in note 105 supra.





procurement and selection of donors. It is very doubtful that such a strict
standard of liability would discourage the operation of blood banks. They
can protect themselves through the purchase of liability insurance, use of
due care in the screening of donors, and even by excluding or modifying
the warranties that attach to the sale of blood.12 In any event, as long as
there is a profit to be made from the procurement and sale of human blood,
the blood banks are certain to continue operations. Even the charitable
blood banks are not likely to cease their functions merely because of the
imposition of liability.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been contended that the imposition of liability for the sale and
transfusion of blood contaminated by the serum hepatitis virus will result
in medical harm to the public."a The arguments advanced are that physi-
cians would become dangerously frugal in their use of blood, a great
economic burden would be placed upon hospitals, blood banks, and physi-
cians, and an acute shortage of blood might result.122 It appears extremely
unlikely that any of these possibilities would ever evolve into reality. In
any event, these are not the important considerations, since they are mere
premises. The important factor to be considered is who should bear the
risk of injury from contaminated blood. Surely, the innocent patient is
not the one who should bear the entire burden of loss. Usually, the pa-
tient is not financially able to absorb such a loss and has suffered enough
physically, through no fault of his own, without subjection to further
suffering through an oppressive financial burden. Physicians, hospitals, and
blood banks, on the other hand, are the proper parties to bear the risk of
serum hepatitis injuries. They are better able to bear this risk through
the purchase of liability insurance. They should bear the risk of loss be-
cause they exercise control over the use and quality of the blood. Even
more important, however, is the highly beneficial result to be obtained by
the imposition of such liability. By holding physicians, hospitals, and blood
banks liable for serum hepatitis injuries, medical research will be encour-
aged to find an effective method of detecting the virus in the blood. As
a result, the "elusive" antigen can finally be detected and completely
eliminated as a possible menace to all those who receive blood transfusions.
120 Id. § 2.316. However, an exclusion or modification of the implied warranties may raise an
express warranty upon which the blood bank could be held liable. See, e.g., Jackson v. Muhlen-
berg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1967).
12 Haut & Alter, supra note 1.
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